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Abstract 
  
We study long-run selection and treatment effects of a health insurance subsidy in Ghana, 
where mandates are not enforceable. We randomly provide different levels of subsidy (1/3, 2/3, 
and full), with follow-up surveys seven months and three years after the initial intervention. We 
find that a one-time subsidy promotes and sustains insurance enrollment for all treatment groups, 
but long-run health care service utilization increases only for the partial subsidy groups. We find 
evidence that selection explains this pattern: those who were enrolled due to the subsidy, especially 
the partial subsidy, are more ill and have greater health care utilization.  
 
Key words: health insurance; sustainability; selection; randomized experiments 
JEL code: I1, O12   
 
  
                                               
 Contact the corresponding author, Hyuncheol Bryant Kim, at hk788@cornell.edu; Asuming: University of Ghana 
Business School; Kim: Department of Policy Analysis and Management, Cornell University; Sim: Department of 
Applied Economics and Management, Cornell University. We thank Ama Baafra Abeberese, Douglas Almond, Diane 
Alexander, Jim Berry, John Cawley, Esteban Mendez Chacon, Pierre-Andre Chiappori, Giacomo De Giorgi, Supreet 
Kaur, Robert Kaestner, Don Kenkel, Daeho Kim, Michael Kremer, Wojciech Kopczuk, Leigh Linden, Corrine Low, 
Doug Miller, Sangyoon Park, Seollee Park, Cristian Pop-Eleches, Bernard Salanie, and seminar participants at 
Columbia University, Cornell University, Seoul National University, and the NEUDC. This research was supported 
by the Cornell Population Center and Social Enterprise Development Foundation, Ghana (SEND-Ghana)." Armand 
Sim gratefully acknowledges financial support from the Indonesia Education Endowment Fund. All errors are our 
own. A previous version of this paper was circulated under the title “Long-Run Consequences of Health Insurance 
Promotion: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Ghana.” 
 
  
1 
 
1. Introduction 
Many poor households in developing countries lack access to health insurance, and their 
poverty is exacerbated by health-related problems (Dercon, 2002). In the absence of insurance, 
households bear a high proportion of medical expenses in the form of out-of-pocket (OOP) 
payments, and face financial constraints that act as significant barriers to health care access 
(Gertler and Gruber, 2002;  Xu et al., 2003; Wagstaff, 2007).1 Many developing countries have 
increasingly been instituting social health insurance schemes (SHIs) to help mitigate the effects of 
adverse health shocks, especially for the poor (WHO, 2005, 2010).2 However, even though SHIs 
are theoretically mandates and offer low sign-up costs and generous benefits to increase 
enrollment, take-up and retention rates remain very low in many countries (Fenny et al., 2016), 
especially among the poorest households (Acharya et al., 2013).3  
Achieving universal coverage or a high enrollment rate is important in terms of risk pooling 
and the sustainability of social health insurance; however, it is often difficult for developing 
countries to successfully impose mandates, primarily due to administrative constraints. For 
example, if those who are more ill or with larger health care service utilization are selected into 
social health insurance, financial burden of the program will increase and become less sustainable.    
There have been various efforts to promote health insurance enrollment and health care utilization, 
but many recent studies find such efforts have limited impact.4  
Even after successfully promoting health insurance enrollment in the short run, retention 
and sustainable improvements in health service utilization and health status remain a challenge. 
The long-run effects of an intervention have important implications for policy. For example, an 
increased retention rate may yield economic and health benefits when individuals engage in health 
services on a regular and timely basis, which may improve the sustainability of the health insurance 
program. Nevertheless, this topic remains relatively understudied. 
                                               
1 The World Health Organization finds that OOP payments as a proportion of private expenditure on health reach 
77.6% in low-income countries (WHO, 2015).  
2 Recent examples of countries that have instituted SHIs include Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Tanzania, and Vietnam. 
Countries in the process of instituting SHIs include Cambodia, Laos, Malaysia, Zimbabwe, and South Africa. 
(Wagstaff, 2010). 
3 In a rural district of Northern Ghana, our study area, the annual fees and premiums of the SHI are about $5; the 
program covers almost 95% of disease conditions without deductibles or copayments. However, by the end of 2010, 
the total active membership reached only 34% of the total population (National Health Insurance Authority (NHIA), 
2011). 
4 For example, Wagstaff et al. (2016) and Capuno et al. (2016) find subsidy and information do not successfully 
promote health insurance enrollment. Thornton et al. (2010) find subsidy increases short-term enrollment but does not 
increase health care service utilization. 
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A subsidy is one of the few successful types of interventions used to promote health 
insurance enrollment (e.g., Thornton et al., 2010). However, an important question emerges 
regarding the level of subsidy. Different levels of subsidy (price) may attract people with different 
characteristics, and this selection may affect health care service utilization and health outcomes 
among the insured.5 The screening effect of subsidy level has been studied for a few health 
products and services, such as facility delivery  (Grepin et al, 2019), malaria bed nets (Cohen and 
Dupas, 2010), and chlorine for water purification (Ashraf, Berry, and Shapiro, 2010), but has not 
been investigated for health insurance in a developing country setting.6  
This study aims to fill this gap in the literature through a field experiment. Similar to 
Kremer and Miguel (2007) and Dupas (2014), we employ experimental variations in exposure to 
a health product and follow the behavioral response in the long run. We randomly selected 
communities for the subsidy intervention and randomized different levels of subsidy (one-third, 
two-thirds, and full subsidy) for the insurance premiums and fees for one-year’s coverage at the 
household level. To measure the impact of these interventions, we conduct a baseline survey and 
two follow-up surveys, one at seven months and the second at three years after the initial 
intervention. 
This experiment has three main objectives. First, we study whether a subsidy for premiums 
and fees promotes health insurance enrollment in the short run. Second, we study whether the level 
of subsidy affects health insurance enrollment, health care service utilization, and health status to 
shed light on the potential selection effect of the level of health insurance subsidy. Third, we study 
whether a one-time intervention could have sustainable impacts on health insurance enrollment, 
health care service utilization, and health outcomes in the long run.  
Three sets of results emerge. First, we find a significant increase in short-run insurance 
take-up. Those receiving one-third, two-thirds, and a full subsidy were 39.3, 48.3, and 53.8 
percentage points, respectively, more likely to enroll in health insurance in the short-run. Three 
years after the initial intervention, we still observe increased enrollment. Those who received one-
                                               
5 In addition, as Dupas (2014) explains, the price level may affect the long-run adoption of health products through 
the “anchoring” mechanism, where a previously encountered price may act as anchor and affect people’s valuation of 
a product regardless of its intrinsic value. 
6 The burgeoning literature in developed countries, especially in the United States, has studied this topic extensively 
(see, for example, Einav, Finkelstein, and Levin, 2010 for a comprehensive overview). 
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third, two-thirds, and a full subsidy were 17.3, 14.0, and 18.9 percentage points, respectively, more 
likely to enroll in health insurance in the long run. 
Second, we find evidence of selection. Those who enrolled due to our intervention 
(compliers) are more ill and have larger health expenditures than those who did not enroll 
regardless of intervention (never-takers). Among compliers, individuals in the partial subsidy 
group are particularly more ill and have larger health expenditures than those in the full subsidy 
group. This evidence suggests that having to pay positive amount of premium and fees induces 
individuals to engage in selective enrollment and maximize net expected benefits of having 
insurance.  
 In addition, we also find that selection patterns are more prominent in the long run. One 
possible explanation is that in the long run individuals have more time to learn about their health 
types as well as cost and benefits of health insurance. These hypotheses are supported by Hendren 
(2019) who shows that the ex-ante value of insurance before an individual has gained information 
on her health type is understated.  
Third, we do not find evidence of improvement in health status despite the increase in 
health care expenditures in the long run, especially for the partial subsidy groups. A possible 
explanation is that people become more sensitive to symptoms and/or aware of their illness, which 
may lead to a reporting problem: misperception of symptoms of an illness. This could happen 
when people with coverage make frequent contacts with health facilities (Finkelstein, et al, 2012).  
In summary, this study shows that a short-term subsidy intervention can successfully 
sustain health insurance enrollment where mandates are not enforceable. At the same time, we also 
observe a selection pattern on observable characteristics, especially in the partial subsidy groups, 
which negatively affects the financial sustainability of social health insurance.   
Our study contributes to three strands of literature. First, our study contributes to the broad 
empirical literature on the effects of health insurance coverage on health outcomes, which has so 
far produced mixed evidence. Thornton et al. (2010), Fink et al. (2013), and King et al. (2009) do 
not find evidence that health insurance affects overall health care expenditures and health 
outcomes in Nicaragua, Burkina Faso, and Mexico, respectively.7 However, Miller, Pinto, and 
                                               
7 Further, Thornton et al. (2010) finds substitution between the use of health clinics covered by health insurance and 
those that are not covered, but overall utilization did not increase. King et al. (2009) find a decrease in catastrophic 
expenditure, but overall changes in health care service utilization are negligible.  
  
4 
 
Vera-Hernandez (2013) find that health insurance coverage improves health care service 
utilization and health outcomes in Colombia. In addition, Gruber, Hendren, and Townsend (2014) 
investigate Thailand’s health care reform and find that increased access to health care among the 
poor could decrease infant mortality. In terms of OOP expenses, some studies observe no or 
adverse effects of insurance on such expenses (e.g., Thornton et al., 2010; Fink et al., 2013), while 
others find the opposite (e.g., Galárraga et al., 2010). Last, the existing literature on health 
insurance in developing countries largely focuses on short-run health effects.8 To our knowledge, 
this study is the first to examine the effects of insurance coverage on both short- and long-run 
health outcomes in a low-income setting. 
Second, our study contributes to the literature on sustainability of health intervention 
programs. This study is, to our knowledge, among the first to document evidence of the long-run 
effects of interventions on insurance enrollment retention in a developing country. While the idea 
of promoting sustainability is attractive, it is difficult to achieve in practice. The challenges in 
promoting sustainable health insurance enrollment could be even greater because health care 
services in developing countries are generally of low quality and unreliable.9 The few studies on 
this topic include those by Kremer and Miguel (2007) and Dupas (2014). In contrast to Kremer 
and Miguel (2007), who find limited evidence that a subsidy promotes long-run adoption of worm 
treatment, Dupas (2014) finds that a one-time subsidy may boost long-run adoption of malaria bed 
nets.  
It is important to note, however, that the long-run effect of a one-time health insurance 
intervention is quite different from that of health product adoption such as worm treatment and 
malaria bed nets. Having health insurance does not necessarily result in improved health status. 
To be successful, health insurance enrollment should promote health care service utilization and 
prevent moral hazard behaviors. In addition, learning about the effects of other health products, 
such as deworming medicine, bed nets, and water disinfectants, could be less setting-specific than 
                                               
8 In the US setting, a RAND experiment reports insignificant effects of insurance coverage on average health outcomes 
but finds negative effects on health outcomes for the more vulnerable subgroups (Newhouse and the Insurance 
Experiment Group, 1993). Relatively recent studies find positive effects of exposure to public health insurance during 
childhood on various long-term health outcomes (Currie, Decker, and Lin, 2008; Miller and Wherry, 2016; Boudreaux, 
Golberstein, and McAlpine, 2016).  
9  See, for example, Banerjee, Deaton, and Duflo, (2004), Goldstein, et al. (2013), and Das, et al., (2016) for 
illustrations of low health care quality in developing countries. Alhassan et al. (2016) provides illustrations for Ghana. 
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the case of health insurance, where the quality of health care services could vary considerably 
across settings.  
Third, our study complements a growing body of work that explains the role of pricing in 
take-up and use of health products and services in developing countries. We study whether the 
characteristics of people who remain enrolled in health insurance in the long run vary by the level 
of subsidy. The effect of prices on utilization of health products and services has received 
considerable attention recently. While proponents of user fees argue that cost-sharing is necessary 
for the sustainability of health programs (World Bank, 1993; Easterly, 2006), there is a concern 
that even a small fee may prevent those most in need from purchasing the product. Recent studies 
aiming to test the existence of the screening effects of higher prices on health product utilization 
find mixed results. While Ashraf, Berry, and Shapiro (2010) find that high prices stimulate product 
use through a screening effect in chlorine for water sanitation, Cohen and Dupas (2010) find no 
effect of higher prices on the use of malaria bed nets.  
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 outlines the research context. 
Section 3 describes the experimental design and data. Section 4 presents the empirical strategy and 
Section 5 presents the main results. Section 6 concludes the paper.  
 
2. Institutional Background 
 
2.1. National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS) in Ghana 
The National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS) in Ghana was established by the National 
Health Insurance Act (Act 560) in 2003. It aims to improve access to and the quality of basic health 
care services for all citizens, especially the poor and vulnerable (Ministry of Health, 2004).  The 
law mandates that every citizen enroll in at least one scheme. However, in practice, there are no 
penalties for those who do not enroll. Most of the 170 administrative districts of Ghana operate 
their own District Mutual Health Insurance Scheme (DMHIS) (Gajate-Garrido and Owusua, 
2013). 10 Each DMHIS accepts and processes applications, collects premiums (and fees), provides 
                                               
10 There are three types of insurance schemes in Ghana: District Mutual Health Insurance Schemes (DMHIS), Private 
Mutual Health Insurance Schemes (PMHIS), and Private Commercial Insurance Schemes (PCHIS). The focus of this 
study is DMHIS, which represents 96 percent of insurance coverage (GSS, GHS and ICF, 2009). They are operated 
and subsidized by the government through the National Health Insurance Fund (NHIF). PMHIS are non-profit non-
subsidized schemes run by NGOs, religious bodies and cooperative societies. PCHISs are for profit schemes that do 
not receive government subsidies. 
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membership identification cards, and processes claims from accredited facilities for 
reimbursement.  
Annual means-tested premiums, which are charged to informal sector workers, range from 
$5 to $ 32. However, owing to the lack of information on household incomes, rural districts tend 
to charge the lowest premiums, while urban districts charge higher premiums. Indigents, pregnant 
women, children under 18 years, and the elderly over 70 years are exempt from premiums but not 
registration fees.11 All members, except for indigents and pregnant women, are required to pay 
registration fees when they first register and when they renew. Those who do not renew their 
membership by the due date pay penalties when they eventually renew their memberships.  
The benefits package of the NHIS, which is the same across DMHISs, is very generous, 
albeit new members wait for three months before they can enjoy the insurance benefits. As 
described in Table A1, the package covers: 1) full outpatient and inpatient (surgery and medical) 
treatments and services, 2) full payment for medications on the approved list, 3) payments for 
referrals on the approved list, and 4) all emergencies. The NHIA (2010) estimates that 95% of 
disease conditions that affect Ghanaians are covered by the scheme. Those who enroll do not pay 
deductibles or copayments for health care service utilization by law; however, according to the 
USAID (2016), health care providers often charge unauthorized fees that are inaccurately 
described as copayments.12 
Despite the low premiums and generous benefits, enrollment in the NHIS remains low. By 
the end of 2010, the total active membership stood at 34% of the population of Ghana (NHIA, 
2011). Enrollment is particularly low among the poorest. A 2008 nationwide survey found that 
only 29% of the individuals in the lowest wealth quintile were active members of the scheme 
compared to 64% of households in the highest quintile (National Development Planning 
Commission, 2009). 
In addition to the lack of affordability, negative perceptions of the NHIS explain the low 
enrollment rate. For example, Alhassan et al. (2016) note that those enrolled in the NHIS generally 
perceive they are not receiving good-quality health care, for reasons such as long wait times and 
                                               
11  The law defines an indigent as “a person who has no visible or adequate means of income or who has nobody to 
support him or her and by the means test.” Specifically, an indigent is a person who satisfies all of these criteria: i) 
unemployed and has no visible source of income, ii) does not have a fixed place of residence according to standards 
determined by the scheme, iii) does not live with a person who is employed and who has a fixed place of residence, 
and iv) does not have any identifiably consistent support from another person. 
12 http://www.africanstrategies4health.org/uploads/1/3/5/3/13538666/country_profile_-_ghana_-_us_letter.pdf 
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the poor attitudes of health staff towards patients. Additionally, Fenny et al. (2016) observe that 
perceived quality of service and socio-cultural factors such as trust, bad attitudes of health facility 
staff, and drug shortage contribute to low enrollment and retention rates in Ghana. 
 
2.2. Setting 
This study was conducted in Wa West, a poor and remote rural district in Northern Ghana 
(Figure A1). It covers an area of approximately 5,899 km2 and had a population of about 81,000 
in 2010. Settlement patterns are highly dispersed, with most residents living in hamlets of about 
100-200 people. This high dispersion, coupled with the poor road network, makes traveling within 
the district difficult and expensive. The economy is largely agrarian, with over 90% of the 
population working as farmers. Estimates from the 2006 Ghana Living Standard Survey indicate 
that average annual per-capita income and health expenditure in a rural savannah locality like Wa 
West were about $252 and $26, respectively (Ghana Statistical Service, 2008).  
In the study area, even though the Community-Based Health and Planning Services 
(CHPS) has increased accessibility to health care services,13 there are only six public health centers 
and no tertiary health facility.14 During the study period, the district had only 15 professional 
nurses and no medical doctor (Nang-Beifua, 2010). The district also has a high disease burden. 
The most common cause of outpatient visits in the region is malaria, which accounts for one third 
of outpatient visits. Other common causes of outpatient visits are acute respiratory-tract infections 
and skin diseases. 
The Wa West DMIHS was introduced in January 2007. In 2011, it charged a uniform 
premium of $5.46 (GHC 8.20) for adults (18-69) and a processing fee of $2.67 (GHC 4) for first-
time members and $0.60 (GHC 1) for renewals. Late renewals incur a fee of $1.30 (GHC 2) in 
addition to full premiums for all years for which membership was not renewed.15 The baseline 
enrollment rate in 2011 for the study sample is 20%.  
 
 
                                               
13 CHPS are community health facilities that provide primary health care. They are located within rural communities 
with limited access to larger hospitals and are manned by nurses. Among the services offered are treatment of common 
ailments (malaria and diarrheal diseases) and maternal and child care services. 
14 About 75% of the communities in the study sample were within 6 km (3.73 mi) of a health facility. 
15 The exchange rate at the time of the study was $1 = GHC 1.5. 
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3. Research Design 
In this section, we discuss the original research design, data collection, definition and construction 
of key variables, descriptive statistics as well as the balance test of baseline characteristics.  
 
3.1. Interventions 
We begin by discussing the original study (Asuming, 2013). Original study introduced 
three interventions to 4406 individuals of 629 household in 59 communities: a subsidy for the 
insurance premiums and fees (Subsidy), an information campaign on the national health insurance 
(Campaign), and an option for individuals to sign up in their community instead of traveling to the 
district capital (Convenience). Interventions were overlapping and randomized at the community 
level. In total, we had eight study groups: Subsidy only, Campaign only, Convenience only, 
Subsidy + Campaign, Subsidy + Convenience, Campaign + Convenience, Subsidy + Campaign + 
Convenience, and a control group. Figure B.1 summarizes our original research design. The 
original study intended to analyze single intervention effects as well as complementarity among 
interventions, but it does not provide enough power to test original hypothesis.    
We extend the original study by implementing a long-term follow-up survey and focus 
only on the Subsidy intervention, which is the most credible intervention in the original design.16 
The Subsidy intervention provides insurance premiums and fees to households in randomly 
selected communities. The level of subsidy was further randomized at the household level: one-
third ($2.67), two-thirds ($5.40), or full ($8.13) subsidy (see Figure 1). Subsidies were given in 
the form of vouchers, which were distributed between November 2011 and January 2012, valid 
for two-month, and redeemable at the Wa West DMHIS center.17 The voucher specified the names, 
ages, and genders of all household members, expiration date, and place of redemption. Households 
                                               
16 The underlying assumption to estimate unbiased causal effects of the Subsidy intervention is that there is no 
complementarity between Subsidy and other treatments, which we demonstrate in Table B.1. None of the eight 
complementarity tests (e.g., Sub + Camp = Sub & Camp) reject the null hypothesis of no complementarity at 5 % 
level. To further investigate the cleaner effects of subsidy variation, we restricted the sample to the control and Subsidy 
only groups (i.e., excluding Subsidy + Campaign, Subsidy + Convenience, and Subsidy + Campaign + Convenience). 
We provide the estimation results in Tables B.2 (effects on enrollment), B.3 and B.4 (short- and long-run effects on 
health care utilization), and B.5 and B.6 (short- and long-run effects on health outcomes). In general, the results are 
similar to the main results. There are some differences, but they do not affect the interpretation of our main findings. 
17 The voucher could also be used to either initiate or renew insurance membership. Those who did not enroll at the 
baseline (80 %) could use the voucher anytime. Those who had already enrolled at the baseline (20 %) could only use 
the voucher if their existing renewal was due within the voucher’s validity period. Otherwise they could not use the 
voucher. 
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that did not receive a full subsidy were informed about the extra amount needed to register all 
members.18  
 
3.2. Data Collection 
The study sample includes 2,954 individuals from 418 households in 44 communities. We 
conducted the baseline survey in September 2011 and implemented the intervention in October 
2011. Two follow-up surveys were conducted, one at seven months and the second three years 
after the intervention. The baseline survey collected information on demographic characteristics, 
employment, health status, health care service utilization, enrollment in the NHIS, and health 
behaviors for all household members.  
The first follow-up survey collected information on health care service utilization, health 
status, and health behaviors. In the second follow-up survey, we collect sets of information similar 
to those in the first follow-up survey but with greater detail to improve the quality of the data. For 
example, we asked for specific dates and the respondent’s status since the first follow-up for up to 
three episodes of several important illnesses, such as malaria, acute respiratory diseases, and skin 
diseases. As a result, there are some differences in the construction of short- and long-run 
utilization measures that prevent a direct comparison of health care service utilization and health 
status in these survey periods.19 
The main outcome variables of interest are health insurance enrollment, health care service 
utilization, health status, and health behaviors.20 Health care service utilization is measured by 
health facility visits in the last four weeks and last six months as well as OOP health expenditure. 
                                               
18 For one-third or two-thirds subsidy households, vouchers took one of two forms: specified and unspecified. If a 
household received a specified subsidy voucher, its members were listed on the voucher, along with the specific 
amount of subsidy for each of them. Thus, reallocation of a subsidy within a household was not possible. If a household 
received an unspecified subsidy voucher, reallocation of the subsidy was possible because the voucher only showed 
the total amount of subsidy for the whole household, not the specific amount for each member. 
19 The health facility visit variable in the first follow-up survey is constructed from the following question: “The last 
time (in the last four weeks/last six months) (NAME) was ill or injured, did he/she visit any health facility?” However, 
in the second follow-up survey, the same variable is constructed from questions about respondents’ visits during illness 
episodes. For example, an individual is said to visit a health facility in the last six months if his/her illness episode 
occurred in the last six months and he/she sought treatment in the health facility. This different structure of questions 
suggests that the magnitude of effects between the short- and long-run are not directly comparable. Studies have 
documented the role of recall periods on self-reported health status and health care utilization in developing countries 
(e.g., Das et al, 2012).  
20 Health insurance enrollment is measured at the individual level. Self-rated health status, which is restricted to those 
aged 18 years or older, is only available in the follow-up surveys. Health behaviors are measured for those aged 12 
years or older.  
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Health status is measured by the number of days of illness in the last four weeks, the indicator and 
the number of days an individual was unable to perform normal daily activities due to illness as 
well as self-rated health status.21 Health behavior is measured based on whether the respondent 
was sleeping under bed nets and using safe water technologies.22 
The attrition rate in the first follow-up survey was relatively low (5 %) but increases in the 
second follow-up survey (21 %), as shown in Table A2.23 The short- and long-run attrition rates 
are not systematically correlated with our interventions.   
 
3.3. Baseline Characteristics and Balance Test 
Table 1 presents the summary statistics of baseline characteristics and balance tests 
between the intervention and control groups. Panels A, B, and C report the average values of the 
individual, household, and community characteristics. Columns 1 and 2 report the average 
characteristics for all respondents and control groups, respectively. The average respondent is 
about 24 years old and 48% are male. About 20% were enrolled in the NHIS at the baseline survey, 
and 36% had ever registered with the scheme. In terms of health characteristics, 12% reported a 
sickness or injury in the last four weeks, about 4% visited a health facility in the last month, and 
14% made a positive OOP health expenditure. The average household lives within 5.4 km of a 
health facility and 20 km from the district capital. 
Our empirical approach requires a balance of baseline characteristics between the 
intervention and control groups that could affect outcome variables. To test this assumption, we 
compare the means of the variables at the baseline (Table 1). Columns 3 to 5 present results from 
regressions of each variable on control and subsidy level indicators. Column 6, which reports the 
p-values from the equality test, shows that only 2 out of 31 tests are statistically significant at the 
10% level. We also compare the baseline differences between each subsidy level group in Columns 
8 to 10. 5 out of 93 t-tests are statistically significant at the 10% level. Overall, these results suggest 
that our randomization is successful in creating balance across the control and treatment groups.     
                                               
21  Variables for limited normal daily activities were derived from the following questions: “During the four weeks, 
did (NAME) have to stop his/her usual activities because of this (illness/injury)?” and “For how many days (in the 
last one month) was (NAME) unable to do his/her usual activities?”  
22 We ask only about sleeping under a bed net in the baseline and short-run follow-up surveys, but we ask for more 
details on bed net and safe water technology use in the long-run survey.  
23 The main reasons for attrition in the first follow-up survey are deceased (17%), traveled (61%), relocated to other 
districts (16%), and others (6%). Information on reasons for attrition is not available in the second follow-up survey. 
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4. Estimation Framework 
To measure the effects of our intervention on various outcomes, we estimate the following 
reduced-form intent-to-treat (ITT) effect of each level of subsidy: 
 
𝑦𝑖ℎ𝑐 =  𝛾0 + 𝛾11/3𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑦𝑖ℎ𝑐 + 𝛾22/3𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑦𝑖ℎ𝑐 +𝛾3𝐹𝑢𝑙𝑙𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑦𝑖ℎ𝑐  
+𝜃𝑋𝑖ℎ𝑐 + 𝛿𝑍ℎ𝑐 + 𝜔𝑉𝑐 + 𝜖𝑖ℎ𝑐     (1) 
where yihc denotes the outcomes for individual i of household h in community c. The outcomes of 
interest include NHIS enrollment, health care service utilization, health status, and health 
behaviors. X denotes a vector of baseline individual covariates, such as indicator variables for age, 
gender, religion, ethnicity, and schooling. Household covariates Z include household size and a 
wealth index indicator (poor third, middle third, and rich third).24 Community covariates V include 
distance to the nearest health facility and to the NHIS registration center. 25 We also control for a 
baseline measure of the dependent variable to improve precision. The results are robust when we 
exclude the baseline controls (results not shown). Estimations employ a linear probability model. 
For each outcome, we present its short- and long-run estimations.  
We cluster standard errors at the community level26 to account for possible correlation in 
the error terms within the same community.27 We also perform 1,000 draws of a wild-cluster 
bootstrap percentile t-procedure suggested by Cameron et al (2008) to address concerns about 
small number of clusters, which could lead to downward-biased standard errors (Bertrand et al., 
2004; Cameron et al., 2008).28 
To obtain the effects of insurance coverage for compliers, we conduct a two-stage least 
squares (2SLS) regression, where the first-stage regression equation is Equation (1) with health 
                                               
24 The wealth index is obtained through a principal components analysis with dwelling characteristics (e.g., number 
of rooms and bedrooms in the house), enterprise (e.g., ownership of any private non-farm enterprise), livestock (e.g., 
number of chickens and pigs), and other assets (e.g., motorcycles and bicycles).   
25 In addition, we controlled for indicators for Subsidy + Campaign, Subsidy + Convenience, and Subsidy + Campaign 
+ Convenience. 
26 To account for correlation within household, we also cluster standard errors at the household level. The results do 
not change our main conclusion (results available upon request).  
27 Individuals in the same community are not completely independent of each other, especially in terms of health-
related outcomes (Srinivasan et al., 2003). There are also studies that find important roles of communities on a host 
of socio-economic outcomes (Kling et al., 2007; Chetty et al., 2016).  
28 Our study has 44 clusters. While there is no clear threshold for too few clusters, the number could vary between 
20 and 50 (Cameron and Miller, 2015). 
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insurance enrollment in the short run as the dependent variable. We estimate the following second-
stage regression: 
 
𝑦𝑖ℎ𝑐=⍺0 + ⍺1𝐸𝑛𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑑𝑖ℎ𝑐̂  +  𝜃𝑋𝑖ℎ𝑐 + 𝛿𝑍ℎ𝑐 + 𝜔𝑉𝑐 + 𝜖𝑖ℎ𝑐 (2) 
 
where we instrument for short-run enrollment. Then, we capture the local average treatment effect 
for those who were induced to enroll in health insurance as results of our subsidy intervention. 29 
Because we estimate Equation (1) for many different outcome variables in health care 
utilization and health status domains, a multiple hypothesis testing problem may occur. The 
probability we incorrectly reject at least one null hypothesis is larger than the conventional 
significance level. We address this concern using two methods. First, we group outcome variables 
into a domain and take the average standardized treatment effect in each domain, as suggested by 
Kling, Liebman, and Katz (2007) and Finkelstein et al. (2012). For the health care utilization 
domain, we group five outcome measures including intensive and extensive measures of health 
facility visits in the last four weeks and last six months and OOP expense incidence. For the health 
status domain, we group four outcomes including self-rated health status, number of days of 
illness, inability to perform normal activities, and the number of days lost to illness. Second, we 
apply the free step-down resampling procedure to adjust the family-wise error rate, that is, the 
probability of incorrectly rejecting one or more null hypotheses within a family of hypotheses 
(Westfall and Young, 1993). Family-wise adjusted p-values of each family are obtained from 
10,000 simulations of estimations.30 
 
5. Results  
 
5.1. Impacts on Insurance Take-up, Sustainability, and Price Elasticity 
Figure 2 shows the enrollment rates of the control and treatment groups at the baseline, 
short-run follow-up, and long-run follow-up surveys by level of subsidy. In general, it shows that 
                                               
29 We assume that income effect of the subsidy ($2.7 - $8.1) is small and negligible given that average income of the 
households in catchment area is $252. 
30 These two methods serve different objectives. The first method is relevant for drawing general conclusions about 
the treatment effects on health care utilization and health status. The second method is more appropriate for examining 
the treatment effect of a specific outcome belonging to a set of tests. 
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enrollment rate increases with subsidy level in the short and long run, but the impacts attenuate 
over time. We observe the largest incremental increase in enrollment rate between receiving zero 
(control group) and one-third subsidy in the short run, but smaller incremental increases in the 
subsequent levels of subsidy. In the long run, the treatment group is still more likely to enroll in 
health insurance, but the differences among the one-third, two-thirds, and full subsidy groups 
become insignificant. 
Table 2 presents the formal regression results. We present robust standard errors in 
parentheses as well as two-tailed wild cluster bootstrap p-values in square brackets. Our results 
show that the effects on enrollment attenuate but are sustained over time. Column 1 of Panel A 
shows that overall subsidy intervention increases short-run insurance enrollment by 43.6 
percentage points (160%). Long-run enrollment also increases by 20.6 percentage points (90%) 
(Column 2).  
In terms of the level of subsidy, receiving a one-third, two-thirds, and full subsidy is 
associated with, respectively, a 39.3, 48.3, and 53.8 percentage points higher likelihood of 
enrolling in insurance in the short run than the control group (Column 1). Even though the 
enrollment rate of the one-third subsidy group is lower than that of the two-thirds and full subsidy 
groups in the short run, the enrollment rate of the one-third subsidy group is at least as large as 
those of the two-thirds and full subsidy groups in the long run (p-value > 0.6).   
The short-run arc elasticities are large. Overall, when price decreases from $8.13 to $0, 
demand for health insurance increases from 27.2% to 81.0% (arc elasticity is -0.54). 31  The 
estimated arc elasticity is close to the elasticity of preventive health products in developing 
countries, such as -0.6 for chlorine, a disinfectant that prevents water-borne diseases in Zambia 
(Ashraf, Berry, and Shapiro, 2010), and -0.37 for insecticide-treated bed nets for malaria 
prevention in Kenya (Cohen and Dupas, 2010). The estimated arc elasticity is also similar to that 
of preventive health products in developed countries, such as -0.17 and -0.43 for preventive health 
care in the United States (Newhouse and the Insurance Experiment Group, 1993) and -0.47 for 
cancer screening in Korea (Kim and Lee, 2017). 
                                               
31 Arc elasticity estimates were obtained using the following formula: [(Ya - Yb)/(Ya + Yb)]/[(Pa - Pb)/(Pa + Pb)], where 
Y and P denote enrollment rate and price, respectively. The short-run arc elasticity estimates when price increases 
from $0 to $2.67, $2.67 to $5.40, and $5.40 to $8.13 are 0.04, 0.19, and 2.10, respectively. Comparing the arc elasticity 
in a zero-price setting to those in other settings could be problematic because the denominator, (Pa - Pb)/(Pa + Pb), is 
always 1 if Pb =0. Moreover, people tend to treat a zero price not only as a decrease in cost but also as an extra benefit 
(Shampanier, Mazar, and Ariely, 2007). These results must be interpreted with this caveat. 
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Our finding that a larger subsidy may lead to higher health insurance enrollment 
corresponds to Finkelstein et al. (2017). However, our finding is contradictory to the special zero 
price argument suggesting that individuals act as if pricing a good as free not only decreases its 
cost but also adds to its benefit (Shampanier et al., 2007). For example, several studies find a larger 
decrease between zero and small non-zero prices in demand for malaria bed nets (Dupas, 2014) 
and HIV testing (Thornton, 2008). In contrast, we find a very large incremental increase in 
enrollment between zero and the one-third subsidy (full and two-thirds price) but no significant 
difference between the two-thirds and full subsidy (one-third and zero price). A possible 
explanation for this finding is the framing of the price of health insurance. Unlike Thornton (2008) 
and Dupas (2014), our subsidy intervention focuses on the level of subsidy instead of the level of 
price, and, therefore, the largest response to the intervention is found between zero and a small 
(one-third) subsidy.  
 
5.2.    Selection into Health Insurance 
Selection into social health insurance could have important implications for the financial 
sustainability of the program, especially when mandates are not enforceable, in that people who 
are more ill or those with larger health care service utilization could be more likely to select into 
the program.  
 We first show evidence of selective retention in health insurance by level of health care 
service utilization. Those who have larger health care service utilization are more likely to remain 
enrolled in health insurance, as shown by the standardized treatment effects (Panels A and B of 
Table A3).  
To gain further insight on selection into health insurance, we compare the individual and 
household characteristics of compliers, always-takers, and never-takers. The impacts we estimate 
are driven by compliers who enroll in health insurance due to our subsidy intervention. Following 
Almond and Doyle (2011) and Kim and Lee (2017), we calculate the mean characteristics and test 
the differences among compliers, always-takers, and never-takers.  
To do so, we first define a binary variable T, an indicator for whether an individual is 
assigned to the treatment group (Subsidy). Next, we define a binary variable H, an indicator for 
whether an individual is enrolled in health insurance. Lastly, we define HT as the value H would 
have if T were either 0 or 1. Hence, E(X|H1 = 1) presents the mean value characteristics of treated 
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individuals who enrolled in health insurance. Under the assumption of existence of the first stage, 
monotonicity, and independence, E(X|H1 = 1) can be written as:  
 
E(X|H1 = 1) = E(X|H1 = 1, H0 = 1)· P(H0 = 1|H1 = 1) + E(X|H1 = 1, H0 = 0) · P(H0 = 0|H1 = 1)    (3) 
 
Equation (3) implies that E(X|H1 = 1) is a sum of always-takers and compliers components. 
E(X|H1 = 1, H0 = 0) represents the characteristics of compliers. E(X|H1 = 1, H0 = 1) = E(X|H0 = 1) 
holds from the monotonicity assumption. P(H0 = 1), the proportion of always-takers, and P(H1 = 
0), the proportion of never-takers, can be directly measured  from  the sample. P(H0 = 1), the 
proportion of always-takers can be thus measured by Pa, the proportion of insurance takers in the 
control group. Similarly, the proportion of never-takers, P(H1 = 0), can also be measured by Pb, 
the proportion of insurance non-takers in the treatment group. The proportion of compliers is 1- Pa 
- Pb. Therefore, P(H0 = 1|H1 = 1) and P(H0 = 0|H1 = 1) are 
𝑃𝑎
𝑃𝑐+𝑃𝑎
  and 
𝑃𝑐
𝑃𝑐+𝑃𝑎
, respectively.32 
By rearranging equation (3), the characteristic of compliers can be calculated as follows:  
 
E(X|H1 = 1, H0 = 0) =  
𝑃𝑐+𝑃𝑎
𝑃𝑐
 × [E(X|H1 = 1) - 
𝑃𝑎
𝑃𝑐+𝑃𝑎
 × E(X|H0 = 1)]       (4) 
   
Table 3 presents the summary statistics of the entire sample, compliers, always-takers, and 
the never-takers for short-run selection (Columns 1 to 4) and long-run selection (Columns 8 to 11). 
Columns 5 to 7 report the t-statistics for the mean comparison between compliers and always-
takers, compliers and never-takers, and always-takers and never-takers in the short run. Columns 
12 to 14 report similar statistics in the long run. By comparing compliers and never-takers, we find 
that our subsidy intervention attracted people who were more ill and had larger health expenditure, 
especially in the long run (Column 13). For example, compliers were more likely to have limited 
daily activities in the last four weeks compared to never-takers, and the differences became larger 
and more significant in the long run.  
Next, we explore the selection pattern by level of subsidy by comparing compliers of the 
full subsidy and partial subsidy intervention. To do so, we restrict the sample to those who were 
                                               
32 The estimated share of compliers, always-takers, and never-takers are 47.4%, 27.1%, and 25.5% in the short run, 
and 24.3%, 23.0%, and 52.7% in the long run, respectively.   
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insured in the Subsidy treatment group. The reasonable assumption that we impose is that always-
takers in the full and partial subsidy groups are the same. Since we restrict our sample to those 
insured in the treatment group, which consists of compliers and always-takers, any difference 
between full and partial subsidy groups in the restricted sample is due to the compositional changes 
of compliers. Table 4 presents the results of 24 regressions where we regress each health 
characteristic on an indicator of full subsidy. The last two rows in Panels A and B report the 
average standardized effects for health status and health care utilization in the short and long run, 
respectively. The results show that partial subsidy compliers are more likely to be ill and have 
larger health care expenditure in the long run but not in the short run. 
In summary, we find that, in general, compliers are more ill and have larger health 
expenditures than never-takers. Among the compliers, those in the partial subsidy group are more 
ill and have larger health expenditure than those in the full subsidy group. In addition, Tables 3 
and 4 show that the selection patterns are more prominent in the long run, suggesting 
heterogeneous impacts of interventions on health care utilization by level of subsidy, especially in 
the long run.  
Stronger selection in the partial subsidy group compared to the full subsidy group is not 
surprising. Those in the partial subsidy group need to pay positive amount of insurance premiums 
and fees, compared to zero-cost for the full-subsidy group. Those with partial subsidy may enroll 
in health insurance only if they expect the net gain to be positive, that is, expected benefits of 
health insurance are greater than the cost. Stronger selection in the long run could be because 
health insurance is an experience good, a service where product characteristics are easier to 
observe upon consumption (Nelson, 1970). For example, those with health insurance can afford to 
make more frequent contacts with medical services. They can collect more private health 
information and learn more about costs and benefits of health insurance than those without 
insurance. These hypotheses are supported by Hendren (2019) who shows that the ex-ante value 
of insurance before an individual has gained information on her health type is understated.  
 
5.3. Impacts on Health Care Services Utilization 
Table 5 presents the effects on utilization of health care services in the short run (Columns 
1 to 6). Column 6 presents average standardized effects; Panels A and B present ITT and 2SLS 
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results, respectively. We report bootstrap and family-wise p-values in square and curly brackets, 
respectively. The long-run effects are presented in Table 6.  
We find that insurance coverage leads to an increase in utilization of health care services 
in both the short and long runs, which corresponds to the fact that health insurance enrollment is 
sustained in the long run (Panel A1 of Tables 5 and 6). It is worth noting that an increase in health 
care service utilization in the long run is at least as high as that in the short run (Columns 6 of 
Tables 5 and 6, respectively) even though the enrollment rate decreased.  
The results regarding health care utilization by level of subsidy are interesting (Panels A2 
and A3 of Tables 5 and 6). Even though the increase in long-run health insurance enrollment is 
similar across subsidy levels and the short-run increase in health care utilization is greater in the 
full subsidy group, we find evidence of an increase in health care utilization in the long run only 
for the partial subsidy group, not the full subsidy group. This result suggests that selection could 
be important for explaining the increase in health care utilization through health insurance 
promotion.  
We also study the impacts on OOP expenses (Column 5). We find limited evidence that 
health insurance prevents OOP expenses either in the short or long run.33 There are a few possible 
explanations for this finding. First, as we described earlier, most services are free under the NHIS, 
but health care providers often charge unauthorized fees as copayments. Second, medicine is often 
in short supply at the public health centers, and those who receive a diagnosis may purchase 
medicine from a private pharmacy. Third, those without health insurance often use traditional or 
herbal medicine which is inexpensive, and therefore, substitution from traditional medicine to 
formal health care does not decrease OOP expenses.  
 
 
 
 
                                               
33 Again, the size effects in the short- and long-run are not directly comparable because the short- and long-run OOP 
expenses are constructed differently. In the short run, respondents were asked about more general OOP expenses, but 
in the long run, OOP expenses only included those related to the treatment of several important illnesses (e.g., malaria, 
skin diseases, and acute respiratory infection). Specifically, for the short-run OOP expense, we use the individual’s 
response to the following question: “On (NAME’s) most recent visit to a health facility, did he/she pay any money 
from his/her own pocket at a health facility in the last six months?” On the other hand, to construct the long-run OOP 
expense, we use information on whether individuals made positive OOP expenses in each illness episode (i.e., malaria, 
acute respiratory infection, and skin diseases) that occurred in the last six months. 
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5.4. Impacts on Health Status  
Table 7 presents the effects on health status in the short run (Columns 1 to 5). Column 5 
presents average standardized effects.34 The long-run effects are presented in Table 8. Panel A1 of 
Table 7 shows that insurance coverage improves health status in the short run. 35 However, Panel 
A1 of Table 8 shows that short-run positive health effect seems to disappear in the long run even 
though health insurance enrollment and health care service utilization continue to increase, as 
shown in Tables 2, 5, and 6. Panel B, which shows the 2SLS results, confirms a similar pattern: 
the emergence of short-run positive health effects (although most are not statistically significant) 
dissipate in the long run. We even find negative health effects on the number of sick days and daily 
activities in the long run (Columns 2 to 4 of Table 8). The negative health consequences in the 
long run are mainly driven by those in the partial subsidy group (Columns 2 to 4 of Panels A2 and 
A3 of Table 8) who also experienced an increase in health care utilization.36  
Negative health consequences despite increased health care utilization in the long run 
appears contradictory. One possible explanation is that people become more sensitive to symptoms 
and/or aware of their illness, which may lead to a reporting problem. This could happen when 
people make frequent contacts with health facilities (Finkelstein, et al, 2012). Those who 
experience health care services could learn about the specific symptoms of illnesses, and thus 
become more sensitive about their health status. Also, those who receive a diagnosis could be more 
aware of the times or periods they were sick. As a result, they are more likely to report being ill. 
Unfortunately, we are not able to test these explanations with our data, especially because 
our health status measures are self-reported, and it is difficult to know whether the negative self-
reported health status reflects an actual deterioration in physical health. More research is needed 
                                               
34We group outcome measures into two domains (i.e., health care utilization and health status) and then take the 
average standardized treatment effect in each domain, as suggested by Kling, Liebman, and Katz (2007) and 
Finkelstein et al (2012). Specifically, we stack individual outcome data within each domain and estimate a single 
regression equation for each domain to obtain the average standardized treatment effect. For the health care utilization 
domain, we group five outcome measures including intensive and extensive measures of health facility visits in the 
last four weeks and last six months and out-of-pocket expense incidence. For the health status domain, we group four 
outcomes including self-reported health status, number of days of illness, inability to perform normal activities, and 
the number of days lost to illness. 
35 Self-rated health status is measured only for those aged 18 years and above. 
36 To help shed light on the lack of long-run health outcomes, we investigate individuals’ health behaviors regarding 
the use of malaria bed nets and safe water technologies. We find some suggestive evidence on the decrease in the 
overall health investments in the full subsidy group, which is not consistent with the results in health utilization and 
status (Column 5 of Table A4).   
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to verify more precise mechanisms through which health insurance enrollment and health care 
utilization may result in a decline in self-reported health status. 
 
6. Conclusion 
This study examines the long-term consequences of one-time short-run subsidy 
interventions on health insurance enrollment, health care service utilization, and health outcomes 
in the long run, especially when mandates are not enforceable. In addition, we study the role of 
pricing in health insurance by measuring important behavioral responses to different levels of 
subsidy (i.e., one-third, two-thirds, and full subsidy). In Northern Ghana, we implement three 
randomized subsidy interventions to promote health insurance enrollment. We then use the 
resulting variation in insurance coverage to estimate the effect of insurance coverage on utilization 
of health care services, OOP expenses, and health status and behaviors.  
We highlight three main findings. First, our interventions significantly promoted 
enrollment in the short run, and while the impacts attenuate, the positive impacts remained three 
years after the initial intervention implementation. Specifically, those treated with one-third, two-
thirds, and full subsidies were 39.3, 48.3, and 53.8 percentage points, respectively, more likely to 
enroll health insurance in the short run, and 17.3, 14.0, and 18.9 percentage points, respectively, 
more likely to enroll in the long run.  
Second, we find evidence of selection, especially in the long run. Compliers are more ill 
and have larger health expenditures than never-takers, and this pattern is more prominent in the 
long run. Among compliers, individuals in the partial subsidy group are particularly more ill and 
have larger health expenditures than those in the full subsidy group. As a result, health care 
expenditures of the partial subsidy group, who more selectively enrolled in health insurance, 
increases in the long run, even though health insurance enrollment rates are similar across levels 
of subsidy. Third, we do not find evidence of improvement in self-reported health status despite 
the increase in health care utilization in the long run. 
Critics of the Ghanaian NHIS have argued that the scheme is overly generous and 
financially unsustainable because of the huge percentage of NHIS members under premium 
exemption without co-payment (Alhassan et al., 2016). The financial state of the NHIS program 
can be further endangered by selection behaviors we find in this study.  
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Our results provide some policy implications for health insurance in other developing 
countries. As mentioned earlier, the general impression of health care services under Ghana’s 
NHIS is not positive implying that the long-run take-up of health insurance and service utilization 
could be higher in a setting with better institutions and health care services. Nevertheless, policy 
makers should be cautious of the presence of selection and behavioral responses since they are 
often difficult to predict and, importantly, may endanger financial stability of an insurance 
program. 
Taken together, these findings highlight that even though short-run interventions 
successfully increase health insurance enrollment, their long-run success in promoting health 
status could depend on behavioral responses such as selection. Our findings suggest that as health 
insurance continues to be introduced in developing counties, both careful enforcement of 
mandatory health insurance enrollment to prevent selection and establishment of policies to 
encourage desirable health behaviors need to be considered.   
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Figures and Tables 
 
Figure 1: Study Design 
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Figure 2: Enrollment Rate by Subsidy Level at Baseline, Short Run, and Long Run 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: This figure shows means of enrollment rates of each subsidy-level group at baseline, short run, and 
long run. Sample includes those who received subsidy and the control group. The vertical lines indicate 95% 
confidence intervals. 
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Table 1: Baseline Characteristics by Subsidy Level Group  
  
Full Control One-third Two-thirds Full p-value
One-Third vs 
Two-Thirds 
One-Third vs 
Full
Two-Thirds 
vs Full
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Panel A: Individual Characteristics
Age 23.780 24.310 1.180 -0.775 -1.620 0.390 2,954 1.955 2.800 0.844
Male 0.481 0.475 0.009 -0.010 0.022 0.578 2,954 0.019 -0.013 -0.031
Christian 0.417 0.373 0.073 0.102 0.058 0.801 2,954 -0.029 0.015 0.044
Dagaaba (ethnic group) 0.517 0.458 0.153 0.208 0.017 0.370 2,954 -0.055 0.136 0.191
Has some formal education 0.335 0.337 -0.022 -0.015 0.009 0.976 2,954 -0.007 -0.031 -0.025
Has a health condition (≥ 6 months) 0.071 0.072 -0.002 -0.002 -0.004 0.996 2,954 -0.001 0.001 0.002
Probably sick next year 0.441 0.436 0.030 0.023 -0.005 0.809 2,845 0.007 0.035 0.028
Overall illness
Ill in the last month (1/0) 0.123 0.105 0.039 0.048 0.016 0.532 2,954 -0.010 0.023 0.032
# of days ill in the last month 0.918 0.846 0.505 0.208 -0.056 0.565 2,927 0.296 0.560 0.264
Could not do normal activities in the last month (1/0) 0.076 0.060 0.011 0.039 0.023 0.428 2,919 -0.028 -0.012 0.016
# of days could not perform normal activities in the last month 0.544 0.480 0.134 0.138 0.079 0.867 2,815 -0.004 0.055 0.060
Malaria 
Ill in the last month (1/0) 0.046 0.041 -0.006 0.028 0.004 0.483 2,931 -0.034 -0.010 0.024
# of days ill in the last month 0.243 0.220 -0.049 0.182 -0.011 0.721 2,909 -0.231 -0.037 0.194
Could not do normal activities in the last month (1/0) 0.025 0.018 -0.002 0.023 0.011 0.431 2,919 -0.025 -0.013 0.012
# of days could not perform normal activities in the last month 0.146 0.128 -0.036 0.056 0.036 0.693 2,815 -0.092 -0.072 0.020
Visited health facility in the last month 0.039 0.036 0.033 0.023 -0.015 0.301 2,435 0.010 0.048 0.038
Visited health facility in the last six months 0.074 0.074 0.025 0.008 -0.014 0.639 2,954 0.016 0.038 0.022
Number of visits in the last month 0.066 0.063 0.062 0.042 -0.036 0.117 2,443 0.020 0.098 0.078*
Visited health facility in the last month for malaria treatment 0.010 0.011 -0.004 0.002 -0.004 0.925 2,435 -0.006 -0.0005 0.006
Made out of pocket expense in the last six months 0.136 0.133 -0.009 0.059 -0.021 0.306 2,954 -0.067 0.012 0.079*
Ever enrolled in NHIS 0.358 0.302 0.179** 0.084 0.071 0.090* 2,954 0.096 0.108 0.012
Currently enrolled in NHIS 0.198 0.197 0.039 0.041 -0.030 0.690 2,954 -0.002 0.069 0.071
Slept under mosquito nets (12 years old or older) 0.501 0.448 0.192** 0.140 0.025 0.111 1,720 0.053 0.168 0.115
Use safe drinking water technology (12 years old or older) 0.024 0.039 -0.039 -0.019 -0.020 0.109 1,286 -0.020 -0.020 0.001
Panel B: Household Characteristics
HH Size 8.703 8.454 -0.187 0.051 0.813 0.517 2,953 -0.238 -0.999 -0.761
Number of children under 18 5.141 4.952 0.054 -0.125 0.641 0.578 2,954 0.179 -0.587 -0.766
Owns farming land 0.553 0.506 0.118 -0.007 0.112 0.363 2,674 0.125 0.006 -0.119
Owns mosquito net 0.711 0.690 0.020 0.146 -0.032 0.139 2,477 -0.125* 0.052 0.177*
Household assets (principal component score) 0.601 0.266 0.580 0.269 0.705** 0.061* 2,953 0.311 -0.126 -0.436
Panel C: Community Characteristics
Distance to NHIS regist (km) 20.010 20.370 4.347 3.447 -4.466 0.303 2,954 0.900 8.812 7.912
Distance to health facility (km) 5.394 5.166 0.221 -0.687 1.017 0.149 2,954 0.908 -0.796 -1.704**
Difference between each subsidy level 
Variable
Mean Difference between subsidy level and control 
N
Notes: Columns 1 and 2 report mean of all respondents and control group. Columns 3 to 5 present results from regressions of each variable on control and subsidy level indicators (1/3, 2/3, and full). Column 
6 reports the p-value from a joint test of equality of the three coefficients reported in Columns 3 to 5. Column 7 reports total number of observations. Columns 8 to 10 present results from separate regressions 
of each variable on one-third and two-thirds subsidy levels (Column 8), on one-third and full subsidy levels (Column 9), and on two-thirds and full subsidy levels (Column 10).  Robust standard errors are 
clustered at community level. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10 %, 5 %, and 1 %. levels, respectively. 
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Table 2: Effects of Subsidy on NHIS Enrollment  
 
   
Short-run Long-run
(1) (2)
Panel A
Any Subsidy 0.436*** 0.206***
(0.048) (0.059)
[0.000] [0.007]
R-squared 0.342 0.160
Panel B
Partial subsidy 0.444*** 0.154*
(0.054) (0.079)
[0.000] [0.094]
Full subsidy 0.530*** 0.192*
(0.060) (0.097)
[0.000] [0.117]
R-squared 0.351 0.183
Panel C
1/3 subsidy 0.393*** 0.173**
(0.072) (0.083)
[0.001] [0.080]
2/3 subsidy 0.483*** 0.140
(0.060) (0.086)
[0.000] [0.153]
Full subsidy 0.538*** 0.189*
(0.057) (0.097)
[0.000] [0.108]
R-squared 0.353 0.183
Number of observations 2,785 2,304
Mean 0.555 0.380
Control group mean 0.272 0.230
P-values on test of equality:
Partial subsidy = Full subsidy 0.097 0.525
1/3 subsidy = 2/3 subsidy 0.196 0.604
1/3 subsidy = Full subsidy 0.016 0.807
2/3 subsidy = Full subsidy 0.339 0.481
Enrollment 
Notes: All regressions include a standard set of covariates (individual, household, and 
community) and baseline measure of dependent variable. P-values for the equality of effect 
estimates for various pairs of treatment groups are also presented. Robust standard errors 
clustered at community level are reported in parentheses. Wild-cluster bootstrap-t p-values 
are reported in square brackets. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10 %, 5 %, 
and 1 % levels, respectively. 
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Table 3: Characteristics of Compliers, Always Takers, and Never Takers 
 
Total Complier Always Never C=A C=N A=N Total Complier Always Never C=A C=N A=N
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
Proportion 100 47.4 27.1 25.5 100 24.3 23.0 52.7
Panel A: Individual Characteristics
Age 23.78 24.34 20.48 24.39 3.61 -0.05 -2.58 23.78 18.90 21.46 27.08 -1.79 -10.12 -3.43
Male 0.48 0.51 0.47 0.48 1.18 1.17 -0.15 0.48 0.51 0.44 0.51 1.90 -0.04 -1.71
Christian 0.42 0.43 0.51 0.40 -2.74 1.24 2.90 0.42 0.37 0.53 0.42 -4.58 -2.38 3.00
Dagaaba (ethnic group) 0.52 0.61 0.54 0.44 2.14 6.89 2.79 0.52 0.59 0.53 0.51 1.70 4.39 0.51
Has some formal education 0.34 0.38 0.35 0.26 0.81 5.61 2.78 0.34 0.42 0.35 0.30 2.16 7.61 1.43
Has a health condition (≥ 6 months) 0.07 0.08 0.05 0.06 2.09 1.37 -0.61 0.07 0.04 0.07 0.09 -1.57 -4.62 -0.96
Probably sick next year 0.44 0.44 0.47 0.45 -1.99 -1.56 0.62 0.44 0.41 0.46 0.45 -2.62 -4.34 0.56
Illness
Ill in the last four weeks 0.12 0.13 0.11 0.14 1.21 -0.13 -0.98 0.12 0.14 0.17 0.11 -1.17 3.05 2.26
No. of days ill in the last four weeks 0.92 1.03 0.75 0.89 1.62 0.91 -0.58 0.92 0.85 1.05 0.93 -0.73 -0.57 0.38
Could not do normal activities in the last four weeks 0.08 0.10 0.04 0.08 5.80 1.93 -2.28 0.08 0.10 0.10 0.07 0.23 3.01 1.04
No. of days could not perform normal activities in the last four weeks 0.54 0.74 0.33 0.43 3.39 3.96 -0.69 0.54 0.42 0.68 0.57 -1.18 -1.39 0.47
Illness due to Malaria
Ill in the last four weeks 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04 -0.40 0.63 0.70 0.05 0.07 0.08 0.03 -0.48 7.78 2.69
No. of days ill in the last four weeks 0.24 0.29 0.32 0.16 -0.30 3.12 1.63 0.24 0.34 0.53 0.14 -1.05 4.16 2.05
Could not do normal activities in the last four weeks 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.02 3.23 2.16 -0.71 0.03 0.07 0.03 0.01 3.64 14.82 1.29
No. of days could not perform normal activities in the last four weeks 0.15 0.17 0.16 0.13 0.16 1.05 0.40 0.15 0.30 0.31 0.05 -0.10 13.68 1.51
Visited health facility in the last four weeks 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.03 -0.43 1.52 1.14 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.03 -1.31 1.53 1.74
Visited health facility in the last six months 0.07 0.07 0.09 0.06 -1.16 0.73 1.37 0.07 0.05 0.13 0.05 -3.40 -0.26 3.12
Number of visits in the last four weeks 0.07 0.06 0.08 0.05 -0.80 0.81 1.07 0.07 0.02 0.10 0.06 -2.24 -2.78 0.99
Visited health facility in the last four weeks for malaria treatment 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.43 1.73 0.50 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.00 -1.19 8.31 2.13
Made out of pocket expense in the last six months 0.14 0.15 0.12 0.14 1.55 0.89 -0.57 0.14 0.15 0.16 0.13 -0.20 1.99 1.03
Ever enrolled in NHIS 0.36 0.30 0.65 0.30 -12.98 0.23 10.02 0.36 0.40 0.41 0.40 -0.22 -0.25 0.08
Currently enrolled in NHIS 0.20 0.05 0.47 0.15 -14.99 -6.38 9.39 0.20 0.14 0.30 0.17 -5.09 -2.34 3.79
Slept under mosquito nets (12 years old or older) 0.50 0.60 0.45 0.49 3.64 3.27 -0.80 0.50 0.62 0.53 0.51 1.76 4.80 0.44
Panel B: Household Characteristics
HH Size 8.70 9.35 8.34 8.57 5.11 5.41 -0.92 8.70 10.18 7.99 8.86 12.989 12.29 -4.07
Number of children under 18 5.14 5.42 5.17 5.08 1.37 2.77 0.39 5.14 5.84 5.12 5.26 3.2613 6.10 -0.57
Male head HH 0.83 0.84 0.87 0.87 -0.46 -0.54 0.02 0.83 0.76 0.92 0.85 -2.699 -2.98 1.04
Owns farming land 0.55 0.69 0.48 0.53 7.08 6.45 -1.24 0.55 0.79 0.48 0.56 8.6766 13.45 -1.94
Owns mosquito net 0.71 0.74 0.73 0.67 0.39 2.86 1.37 0.71 0.52 0.91 0.74 -18.36 -18.15 6.04
Knowledge about NHIS 0.59 0.57 0.61 0.61 -2.00 -2.34 0.00 0.59 0.59 0.60 0.59 -0.351 -0.21 0.25
Household assets (principal component score) 0.60 1.09 0.77 0.59 2.56 5.69 1.19 0.60 2.29 0.16 0.59 23.213 71.18 -3.50
Short-run Long-run
Mean t-stat Mean t-stat
Note: This table presents the mean individual (Panel A) and household (Panel B) characteristics of the entire sample, compliers and always takers, and never takers. The mean characteristics of compliers are estimated 
from Equation (4). Columns 5-7 and 12-14 present the t-statistics from the two-sample t-test comparing compliers with always takers, compliers with never takers, and always takers with never takers, respectively. 
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Table 4: Selection by Subsidy Level  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sample
Independent variable: Received full subsidy Coefficient
Standard 
error
bootstrap p -
values
N R-squared
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Short run 
Healthy or very healthy -0.022 (0.027) 0.376 413 0.037
# Days ill last month -0.034 (0.092) 0.775 1,238 0.005
Could not perform normal daily activities due to illness last month -0.007 (0.019) 0.741 1,244 0.010
# days could not perform normal daily activities in the last month -0.008 (0.262) 0.978 1,244 0.003
# Days ill last month (Malaria) -0.045 (0.034) 0.257 1,237 0.011
Could not perform normal daily activities due to illness last month (Malaria) -0.006 (0.011) 0.587 1,238 0.009
# days could not perform normal daily activities in the last month (Malaria) -0.031 (0.107) 0.800 1,238 0.003
Visited health facility in last four weeks -0.010 (0.017) 0.600 1,152 0.017
Visited health facility in last six months -0.001 (0.027) 0.978 1,223 0.025
# of visits in last six months 0.004 (0.012) 0.794 1,148 0.010
Visited Facility for malaria treatment in the last four weeks -0.018 (0.011) 0.169 1,200 0.008
Made an out-of-pocket for health service in the last six months -0.006 (0.016) 0.754 1,244 0.008
Standardized treatment effects (health status) -0.003 (0.005) 7,852 0.006
Standardized treatment effects (health care utilization) -0.007 (0.008) 5,967 0.009
Sample
Independent variable: Received full subsidy Coefficient
Standard 
error
bootstrap p -
values
N R-squared
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel B: Long run
Healthy or very healthy 0.210* (0.103) 0.117 174 0.078
# Days ill last month -1.106*** (0.338) 0.012 674 0.049
Could not perform normal daily activities due to illness last month -0.085* (0.044) 0.117 674 0.027
# days could not perform normal daily activities in the last month -0.730* (0.411) 0.066 674 0.033
# Days ill last month (Malaria) -0.613*** (0.206) 0.032 674 0.037
Could not perform normal daily activities due to illness last month (Malaria) -0.079** (0.033) 0.034 674 0.034
# days could not perform normal daily activities in the last month (Malaria) -0.522** (0.222) 0.023 674 0.037
Visited health facility in last four weeks -0.122*** (0.034) 0.018 674 0.044
Visited health facility in last six months -0.242*** (0.075) 0.033 674 0.088
# of visits in last six months -0.099** (0.041) 0.080 674 0.033
Visited Facility for malaria treatment in the last four weeks -0.090** (0.037) 0.073 674 0.033
Made an out-of-pocket for health service in the last six months -0.034 (0.023) 0.152 674 0.018
Standardized treatment effects (health status) -0.076** (0.031) 4,218 0.032
Standardized treatment effects (health care utilization) -0.116*** (0.034) 3,370 0.038
Among those enrolled in the short run
Among those enrolled in the long run
Notes: This table reports estimation results of running regression of each selected health characteristics on an indicator variable that takes 
value of one if receiving full subsidy (zero price) and zero if receiving partial subsidy (positive price). We control for indicators of other 
interventions involving subsidy: Subsidy + Campaign, Subsidy + Convenience, and Subsidy + Campaign + Convenience. Sample is 
restricted to those who received partial and full subsidy. Panel A summarizes regression results when sample is restricted to those who 
enrolled in the short run. Panel B summarizes results when sample is restricted to those who enrolled in the long run. Standardized treatment 
effects on health status and health care utilization in the short and long run are reported in the last two rows of Panels A and B, respectively. 
Robust standard errors clustered at community level reported in parantheses. Wild-cluster bootstrap-t p-values are reported in Column 3. 
*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10 %, 5 %, and 1 % level respectively. 
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Table 5: Effects on Healthcare Services Utilization (Short Run)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Visited health 
facility in last 
four weeks
Visited health 
facility in last 
six months
# of visits in last 
four weekss
Visited facility 
for malaria 
treatment in the 
last four weeks
Made out-of-
pocket for health 
service in the last 
six months
Standardized 
treatment effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: ITT results
Panel A1
Any subsidy 0.020 0.053** 0.031 0.018** 0.011 0.021*
(0.017) (0.021) (0.022) (0.008) (0.013) (0.011)
[0.294] [0.035] [0.247] [0.069] [0.457]
{0.500} {0.202} {0.475} {0.254} {0.500}
R-squared 0.099 0.119 0.062 0.066 0.092 0.054
Panel A2
Partial subsidy -0.008 0.009 -0.003 0.008 -0.009 -0.0001
(0.013) (0.019) (0.024) (0.009) (0.015) (0.010)
[0.591] [0.623] [0.883] [0.387] [0.598]
{0.944} {0.944} {0.944} {0.869} {0.944}
Full subsidy 0.008 0.001 0.007 0.001 -0.013 0.004
(0.022) (0.031) (0.038) (0.012) (0.023) (0.016)
[0.716] [0.963] [0.875] [0.973] [0.585]
{0.990} {0.998} {0.998} {0.998} {0.979}
R-squared 0.106 0.129 0.065 0.074 0.094 0.058
Panel A3
1/3 subsidy -0.0003 0.009 -0.012 0.009 -0.015 0.001
(0.016) (0.022) (0.023) (0.011) (0.014) (0.011)
[0.974] [0.668] [0.629] [0.464] [0.325]
{0.986} {0.918} {0.918} {0.881} {0.803}
2/3 subsidy -0.014 0.009 0.004 0.007 -0.004 -0.001
(0.014) (0.023) (0.030) (0.010) (0.020) (0.011)
[0.390] [0.697] [0.901] [0.480] [0.842]
{0.851} {0.965} {0.974} {0.898} {0.974}
Full subsidy 0.007 0.001 0.008 0.0004 -0.012 0.004
(0.021) (0.031) (0.038) (0.011) (0.023) (0.016)
[0.746] [0.962] [0.830] [0.970] [0.678]
{0.996} {0.998} {0.996} {0.998} {0.984}
R-squared 0.106 0.129 0.065 0.074 0.094 0.058
Number of observations 2,130 2,710 2,124 2,252 2,805 11,008
Panel B: 2SLS results
Enrolled in NHIS -0.007 0.011 0.005 0.011 -0.019 0.002
(0.024) (0.041) (0.050) (0.015) (0.035) (0.021)
First-stage F-statistics 26.646 25.134 25.559 26.421 26.608 27.884
Control group mean 0.038 0.102 0.032 0.019 0.046 -0.011
P-values on test of equality:
Partial subsidy = Full subsidy 0.491 0.751 0.783 0.543 0.825 0.784
1/3 subsidy = 2/3 subsidy 0.419 0.987 0.500 0.893 0.515 0.819
1/3 subsidy = Full subsidy 0.743 0.786 0.560 0.480 0.821 0.854
2/3 subsidy = Full subsidy 0.437 0.769 0.908 0.625 0.710 0.770
Short run
Notes: Panels A and B report ITT and 2SLS results, respectively. Panels A1, A2, and A3 report the effects of receiving any subsidy, partial 
and full subsidy, and each subsidy level (1/3, 2/3, and full), respectively. All regressions include a standard set of covariates (individual, 
household, and community) and baseline measure of dependent variable. Standardized treatment effects are reported in Column 6. P-values 
for the equality of effect estimates for various pairs of treatment groups are also presented. Robust standard errors clustered at community 
level are reported in parentheses. Wild-cluster bootstrap-t p-values are reported in square brackets. Family-wise p-values are reported in curly 
brackets.  *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10 %, 5 %, and 1 % levels, respectively. 
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Table 6: Effects on Healthcare Services Utilization (Long Run)  
 
 
Visited health 
facility in last 
four weeks
Visited health 
facility in last 
six months
# of visits in last 
four weekss
Visited facility 
for malaria 
treatment in the 
last four weeks
Made out-of-
pocket for health 
service in the last 
six months
Standardized 
treatment effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: ITT results
Panel A1
Any subsidy 0.038*** 0.079*** 0.033*** 0.028*** 0.009 0.038***
(0.009) (0.018) (0.010) (0.010) (0.008) (0.010)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.009] [0.022] [0.378]
{0.018} {0.012} {0.054} {0.077} {0.375}
R-squared 0.077 0.084 0.060 0.064 0.087 0.062
Panel A2
Partial subsidy 0.048*** 0.108*** 0.038*** 0.035** 0.013 0.048***
(0.013) (0.025) (0.012) (0.014) (0.010) (0.012)
[0.001] [0.001] [0.004] [0.024] [0.256]
{0.062} {0.033} {0.08} {0.151} {0.287}
Full subsidy -0.029 -0.013 -0.033 -0.035 -0.038* -0.037
(0.020) (0.053) (0.023) (0.021) (0.022) (0.023)
[0.222] [0.849] [0.243] [0.201] [0.057]
{0.63} {0.854} {0.63} {0.63} {0.63}
R-squared 0.094 0.102 0.078 0.084 0.103 0.079
Panel A3
1/3 subsidy 0.020 0.085** 0.016 0.019 0.025 0.036*
(0.015) (0.034) (0.017) (0.016) (0.027) (0.021)
[0.297] [0.057] [0.441] [0.328] [0.719]
{0.603} {0.41} {0.681} {0.615} {0.681}
2/3 subsidy 0.070*** 0.125*** 0.056*** 0.048*** 0.004 0.058***
(0.016) (0.032) (0.017) (0.018) (0.011) (0.015)
[0.000] [0.001] [0.010] [0.019] [0.794]
{0.029} {0.041} {0.058} {0.114} {0.812}
Full subsidy -0.025 -0.010 -0.030 -0.033 -0.039 -0.035
(0.020) (0.054) (0.024) (0.021) (0.024) (0.024)
[0.319] [0.913] [0.265] [0.249] [0.100]
{0.647} {0.894} {0.647} {0.647} {0.647}
R-squared 0.099 0.103 0.081 0.086 0.105 0.080
Number of observations 2,228 2,688 2,231 2,228 2,688 11,140
Panel B: 2SLS results
Enrolled in NHIS 0.051 0.145** 0.038 0.031 -0.017 0.041
(0.033) (0.061) (0.031) (0.033) (0.020) (0.032)
First-stage F-statistics 33.381 34.796 32.094 31.355 32.844 35.857
Control group mean 0.017 0.050 0.036 0.010 0.013 -0.021
P-values on test of equality:
Partial subsidy = Full subsidy 0.000 0.010 0.004 0.002 0.085 0.001
1/3 subsidy = 2/3 subsidy 0.015 0.355 0.110 0.177 0.539 0.417
1/3 subsidy = Full subsidy 0.068 0.092 0.093 0.049 0.197 0.063
2/3 subsidy = Full subsidy 0.000 0.006 0.003 0.001 0.019 0.000
Long run
Notes: Panels A and B report ITT and 2SLS results, respectively. Panels A1, A2, and A3 report the effects of receiving any subsidy, partial 
and full subsidy, and each subsidy level (1/3, 2/3, and full), respectively. All regressions include a standard set of covariates (individual, 
household, and community) and baseline measure of dependent variable. Standardized treatment effects are reported in Column 6. P-values 
for the equality of effect estimates for various pairs of treatment groups are also presented. Robust standard errors clustered at community 
level are reported in parentheses. Wild-cluster bootstrap-t p-values are reported in square brackets. Family-wise p-values are reported in curly 
brackets.  *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10 %, 5 %, and 1 % levels, respectively. 
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Table 7: Effects on Health Status (Short Run)   
 
 
 
 
 
 
Healthy or very 
healthy
# of days ill last 
four weeks
Could not 
perform normal 
daily activities 
due to illness 
last four weeks
# of days could 
not perform 
normal daily 
activities due to 
illness in the last 
four weeks
Standardized 
treatment effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: ITT results
Panel A1
Any subsidy 0.059 -0.275** 0.007 -0.355 -0.018
(0.042) (0.116) (0.017) (0.280) (0.013)
[0.182] [0.019] [0.743] [0.289]
{0.501} {0.179} {0.741} {0.501}
R-squared 0.176 0.085 0.079 0.092 0.063
Panel A2
Partial subsidy 0.130*** -0.309** -0.012 -0.076 -0.025*
(0.037) (0.135) (0.017) (0.368) (0.013)
[0.003] [0.036] [0.567] [0.850]
{0.035} {0.145} {0.717} {0.865}
Full subsidy 0.118** -0.409* -0.021 -0.511 -0.041*
(0.044) (0.211) (0.030) (0.508) (0.022)
[0.009] [0.071] [0.527] [0.357]
{0.099} {0.222} {0.543} {0.488}
R-squared 0.192 0.086 0.080 0.094 0.064
Panel A3
1/3 subsidy 0.121*** -0.399** -0.011 -0.383 -0.034**
(0.041) (0.158) (0.023) (0.411) (0.017)
[0.011] [0.033] [0.68] [0.408]
{0.071} {0.094} {0.688} {0.546}
2/3 subsidy 0.136*** -0.241 -0.013 0.166 -0.018
(0.044) (0.174) (0.020) (0.429) (0.015)
[0.011] [0.245] [0.623] [0.773]
{0.09} {0.54} {0.741} {0.757}
Full subsidy 0.119*** -0.395* -0.021 -0.453 -0.040*
(0.044) (0.214) (0.030) (0.508) (0.022)
[0.01] [0.115] [0.534] [0.425]
{0.097} {0.256} {0.554} {0.554}
R-squared 0.192 0.086 0.080 0.095 0.064
Number of observations 861 2,768 2,775 2,677 8,824
Panel B: 2SLS results
Enrolled in NHIS 0.238*** -0.691** -0.039 -0.536 -0.067**
(0.074) (0.311) (0.037) (0.806) (0.028)
First-stage F-statistics 22.737 26.609 27.019 26.858 27.464
Control group mean 0.817 0.617 0.081 1.379 -0.019
P-values on test of equality:
Partial subsidy = Full subsidy 0.723 0.477 0.710 0.179 0.278
1/3 subsidy = 2/3 subsidy 0.722 0.409 0.921 0.212 0.400
1/3 subsidy = Full subsidy 0.970 0.979 0.701 0.848 0.731
2/3 subsidy = Full subsidy 0.664 0.333 0.764 0.100 0.221
Short run
Notes: Panels A and B report ITT and 2SLS results, respectively. Panels A1, A2, and A3 report the effects of receiving any subsidy, partial and 
full subsidy, and each subsidy level (1/3, 2/3, and full), respectively. All regressions include a standard set of covariates (individual, household, 
and community) and baseline measure of dependent variable. Standardized treatment effects are reported in Column 5. P-values for the equality 
of effect estimates for various pairs of treatment groups are also presented. Robust standard errors clustered at community level are reported in 
parentheses. Wild-cluster bootstrap-t p-values are reported in square brackets. Family-wise p-values are reported in curly brackets.  *, **, and 
*** denote statistical significance at 10 %, 5 %, and 1 % levels, respectively. 
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Table 8: Effects on Health Status (Long Run) 
   
 
Healthy or very 
healthy
# of days ill last 
four weeks
Could not 
perform normal 
daily activities 
due to illness 
last four weeks
# of days could 
not perform 
normal daily 
activities due to 
illness in the last 
four weeks
Standardized 
treatment effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: ITT results
Panel A1
Any subsidy -0.076 0.221** 0.030*** 0.178** 0.036***
(0.050) (0.092) (0.010) (0.074) (0.012)
[0.166] [0.035] [0.009] [0.028]
{0.194} {0.132} {0.055} {0.132}
R-squared 0.289 0.071 0.084 0.059 0.054
Panel A2
Partial subsidy -0.156** 0.294*** 0.048*** 0.284*** 0.058***
(0.058) (0.087) (0.013) (0.082) (0.013)
[0.166] [0.035] [0.009] [0.028]
{0.051} {0.031} {0.029} {0.031}
Full subsidy -0.130 -0.352* -0.006 -0.179 -0.028
(0.093) (0.175) (0.020) (0.185) (0.027)
[0.042] [0.025] [0.007] [0.024]
{0.566} {0.379} {0.82} {0.604}
R-squared 0.301 0.083 0.099 0.077 0.068
Panel A3
1/3 subsidy -0.081 0.205 0.035** 0.240* 0.042**
(0.067) (0.141) (0.016) (0.129) (0.020)
[0.254] [0.127] [0.823] [0.535]
{0.396} {0.396} {0.286} {0.325}
2/3 subsidy -0.221*** 0.362*** 0.058*** 0.318*** 0.071***
(0.074) (0.100) (0.016) (0.108) (0.018)
[0.29] [0.212] [0.063] [0.123]
{0.051} {0.032} {0.033} {0.051}
Full subsidy -0.140 -0.339* -0.004 -0.171 -0.026
(0.090) (0.170) (0.020) (0.176) (0.026)
[0.021] [0.008] [0.017] [0.033]
{0.497} {0.387} {0.872} {0.614}
R-squared 0.307 0.084 0.100 0.077 0.068
Number of observations 658 2,666 2,661 2,564 8,309
Panel B: 2SLS results
Enrolled in NHIS -0.306** 0.173 0.067** 0.289 0.066*
(0.120) (0.226) (0.031) (0.202) (0.036)
First-stage F-statistics 42.373 34.195 33.371 33.838 33.695
Control group mean 0.791 0.413 0.013 0.096 0.011
P-values on test of equality:
Partial subsidy = Full subsidy 0.764 0.000 0.010 0.015 0.002
1/3 subsidy = 2/3 subsidy 0.140 0.351 0.278 0.650 0.275
1/3 subsidy = Full subsidy 0.397 0.009 0.089 0.015 0.012
2/3 subsidy = Full subsidy 0.476 0.000 0.008 0.028 0.002
Long run
Notes: Panels A and B report ITT and 2SLS results, respectively. Panels A1, A2, and A3 report the effects of receiving any subsidy, partial and 
full subsidy, and each subsidy level (1/3, 2/3, and full), respectively. All regressions include a standard set of covariates (individual, household, 
and community) and baseline measure of dependent variable. Standardized treatment effects are reported in Column 5. P-values for the equality 
of effect estimates for various pairs of treatment groups are also presented. Robust standard errors clustered at community level are reported in 
parentheses. Wild-cluster bootstrap-t p-values are reported in square brackets. Family-wise p-values are reported in curly brackets.  *, **, and 
*** denote statistical significance at 10 %, 5 %, and 1 % levels, respectively. 
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Appendix A 
 
Figure A.1. Wa West District Map 
 
 
Note: This map shows the Upper West region of Ghana, which includes Wa West district (highlighted).  
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Table A1: NHIS Coverage 
Included Services Exclusion List 
1 Out-Patient Services     1 Rehabilitation other than   
  i) General and specialized consultation and review  physiotherapy    
  ii) Requested investigation (including laboratory         
   investigations, x-rays and ultrasound scanning) 2 Appliances and protheses including 
  iii) Medication (prescription drugs on the NHIS Drug List)  optical aids, hearing aids, othopedic aids  
  iv) HIV/AIDS symptomatic treatment for opportunistic  and dentures    
   infection            
  v) Out-patient/Day Surgery Operations including hernia 3 Cosmetic surgeries and aesthetic 
   repairs, incision and drainage, hemorrhoidectomy  treatment     
  vi) Out-patient physiotherapy          
         4 HIV retroviral drugs    
2 In-Patient Services           
  i) General and specialist in-patient care   5 Assisted reproduction eg artificial 
  ii) Requested investigations     insemination and gynecological    
  iii) Medication (prescription drugs on NHIS Drug List)  hormone replacement therapy   
  iv) Cervical and Breast Cancer Treatment         
  v) Surgical Operations     6 Echocardiography    
  vi) In-patient physiotherapy          
  vii) Accommodation in general ward    7 Photography    
  viii) Feeding (where available)          
         8 Angiography    
3 Oral Health Services           
  i) Pain relief which includes incision and drainage, tooth 9 Orthotics     
   extraction and temporary relief          
  ii) Dental restoration which includes simple amalgam 10 Dialysis for chronic renal failure 
   fillings and temporary dressing          
         11 Heart and brain surgery other than 
4 Eye Care Services      those resulting from accident   
  i) Refraction, visual fields and A-Scan         
  ii) Keratometry     12 Cancer treatment other than   
  iii) Cataract removal      cervical ad breast cancer   
  iv) Eye lid surgery           
         13 Organ transplating    
5 Maternity Care            
  i) Antenatal care     14 All drugs that not listed on the    
  ii) Deliveries (normal and assisted)     NHIS Drug List    
  iii) Caesarian section           
  iv) Postnatal care     15 Diagnosis and treatment abroad   
               
6 Emergencies      16 Medical examinations for purposes 
  i) Medical emergencies      of visa applications, Campaign and 
  ii) Surgical emergencies including brain surgery due to  institutional driving license   
   accidents            
  iii) Pediatric emergencies     17 VIP ward accommodation   
  iv) Obstetric and gynecological emergencies         
  v) Road traffic accidents     18 Mortuary Services    
  vi) Industrial and workplace accidents         
  vii) Dialysis for acute renal failure               
Source: NHIA (2011)          
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Table A2: Attrition 
  
Short run Long run
(1) (2)
Panel A
Any subsidy 0.005 -0.045
(0.021) (0.036)
[0.855] [0.259]
R-squared 0.133 0.102
Panel B
Partial subsidy 0.004 -0.042
(0.025) (0.038)
[0.895] [0.302]
Full subsidy 0.013 -0.065
(0.044) (0.053)
[0.809] [0.311]
R-squared 0.144 0.104
Panel C
1/3 subsidy -0.005 -0.039
(0.043) (0.051)
[0.924] [0.533]
2/3 subsidy 0.011 -0.045
(0.024) (0.042)
[0.664] [0.314]
Full subsidy 0.014 -0.066
(0.044) (0.051)
[0.779] [0.298]
R-squared 0.144 0.104
Mean 0.05 0.21
Number of observations 2953 2953
Notes: Dependent variable is a binary variable indicating whether an 
individual had been attrited in the short- and long-run follow-up 
surveys. All regressions include a standard set of covariates 
(individual, household, and community). Robust standard errors 
clustered at community level reported in parantheses. *, **, and *** 
denote statistical significance at 10 %, 5 %, and 1 % levels, 
respectively. 
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Table A3: Selective Retention of Health Insurance by Characteristics 
 
 
Sample
Independent variable: Enrolled at the first follow-up
Coefficient Standard error bootstrap p-
values
N R-squared
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Short run
Healthy or very healthy 0.020 (0.058) 0.740 161 0.001
# Days ill last month -0.354 (0.338) 0.338 531 0.004
Could not perform normal daily activities due to illness last month 0.029 (0.038) 0.507 535 0.002
# days could not perform normal daily activities in the last month -0.037 (0.690) 0.979 535 0.00001
# Days ill last month (Malaria) -0.064 (0.119) 0.617 531 0.001
Could not perform normal daily activities due to illness last month (Malaria) 0.017 (0.019) 0.444 532 0.002
# days could not perform normal daily activities in the last month (Malaria) -0.002 (0.269) 0.990 532 0.0000001
Visited health facility in last four weeks 0.035 (0.025) 0.219 497 0.004
Visited health facility in last six months 0.114** (0.043) 0.027 513 0.017
# of visits in last six months 0.037* (0.021) 0.121 494 0.004
Visited Facility for malaria treatment in the last four weeks 0.034* (0.020) 0.146 511 0.005
Made an out-of-pocket for health service in the last six months -0.010 (0.029) 0.849 535 0.001
Standardized treatment effects (health status) -0.001 (0.017) 3,357 0.00001
Standardized treatment effects (health care utilization) 0.030* (0.017) 2,550 0.004
Sample
Independent variable: Enrolled at the second follow-up
Coefficient Standard error bootstrap p-
values
N R-squared
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel B: Long run
Healthy or very healthy -0.008 (0.067) 0.910 360 0.0001
# Days ill last month 0.210 (0.168) 0.253 1,305 0.003
Could not perform normal daily activities due to illness last month 0.021 (0.017) 0.239 1,305 0.003
# days could not perform normal daily activities in the last month 0.119 (0.135) 0.520 1,305 0.002
# Days ill last month (Malaria) 0.049 (0.093) 0.625 1,305 0.0003
Could not perform normal daily activities due to illness last month (Malaria) 0.016 (0.015) 0.305 1,305 0.002
# days could not perform normal daily activities in the last month (Malaria) 0.066 (0.087) 0.557 1,305 0.001
Visited health facility in last four weeks 0.047** (0.018) 0.003 1,305 0.012
Visited health facility in last six months 0.139*** (0.039) 0.000 1,305 0.042
# of visits in last six months 0.038** (0.018) 0.017 1,305 0.008
Visited Facility for malaria treatment in the last four weeks 0.030* (0.016) 0.044 1,305 0.006
Made an out-of-pocket for health service in the last six months -0.025* (0.013) 0.074 1,305 0.007
Standardized treatment effects (health status) 0.013 (0.012) 8,190 0.001
Standardized treatment effects (health care utilization) 0.038** (0.018) 6,525 0.006
Among those enrolled in the baseline
Among those enrolled in the short run
Notes: This table reports estimation results of running univariate regression of each selected health characteristics on an enrollment indicator in short 
and long-run. Panel A summarizes regression results when sample is restricted to those who enrolled in the baseline. Panel B summarizes results 
when sample is restricted to those who enrolled in the short run. Standardized treatment effects on health status and health care utilization in the short 
and long run are reported in the last two rows of Panels A and B, respectively. Robust standard errors clustered at community level reported in 
parantheses. Robust standard errors clustered at community level reported in parantheses. Wild-cluster bootstrap-t p-values are reported in Column 
3. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10 %, 5 %, and 1 % level respectively. 
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Table A4: Effects on Health Behaviors.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Short run
Sleep under 
mosquito nets 
Have mosquito 
nets
Sleep under 
mosquito nets 
Water safe to 
drink 
Standardized 
treatment effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: ITT results
Panel A1
Any subsidy 0.085 -0.035 0.016 -0.072 -0.032
(0.065) (0.088) (0.072) (0.049) (0.041)
[0.251] [0.752] [0.85] [0.218]
{0.933} {0.933} {0.588}
R-squared 0.233 0.258 0.235 0.257 0.155
Panel A2
Partial subsidy 0.098 0.039 0.036 -0.071 -0.018
(0.113) (0.094) (0.123) (0.045) (0.044)
[0.457] [0.758] [0.806] [0.149]
{0.926} {0.926} {0.522}
Full subsidy 0.227* -0.269** -0.044 -0.014 -0.117**
(0.118) (0.106) (0.118) (0.068) (0.051)
[0.113] [0.064] [0.749] [0.878]
{0.241} {0.946} {0.946}
R-squared 0.247 0.318 0.259 0.275 0.179
Panel A3
1/3 subsidy 0.020 0.146 0.072 -0.054 0.021
(0.110) (0.117) (0.127) (0.057) (0.047)
[0.886] [0.343] [0.664] [0.394]
{0.716} {0.724} {0.724}
2/3 subsidy 0.158 -0.065 0.009 -0.087* -0.055
(0.141) (0.089) (0.131) (0.044) (0.049)
[0.396] [0.567] [0.959] [0.061]
{0.796} {0.956} {0.355}
Full subsidy 0.238** -0.294*** -0.050 -0.017 -0.127**
(0.118) (0.097) (0.120) (0.068) (0.051)
[0.088] [0.022] [0.723] [0.829]
{0.143} {0.931} {0.931}
R-squared 0.252 0.333 0.260 0.276 0.182
Number of observations 1,422 1,101 1,092 497 2,069
Panel B: 2SLS results
Enrolled in NHIS 0.306 -0.184 0.027 -0.091 -0.085
(0.204) (0.148) (0.219) (0.083) (0.078)
First-stage F-statistics 29.175 38.614 28.639 42.639 56.943
Control group mean 0.447 0.290 0.661 0.080 0.007
P-values on test of equality:
Partial subsidy = Full subsidy 0.274 0.001 0.179 0.166 0.003
1/3 subsidy = 2/3 subsidy 0.303 0.043 0.382 0.482 0.008
1/3 subsidy = Full subsidy 0.096 0.0001 0.131 0.490 0.00004
2/3 subsidy = Full subsidy 0.544 0.011 0.340 0.106 0.049
Long run
Note: Health behaviors are measured for those aged 12 years and above. Dependent variable in Column 4 is an indicator variable of whether a household 
member does anything to their water to make it safe to drink. Panels A and B report ITT and 2SLS results, respectively. Panels A1, A2, and A3 report the 
effects of receiving any subsidy, partial and full subsidy, and each subsidy level (1/3, 2/3, and full), respectively. All regressions include a standard set of 
covariates (individual, household, and community) and baseline measure of dependent variable. Standardized treatment effect in the long run is reported 
in Column 5. P-values for the equality of effect estimates for various pairs of treatment groups are also presented. Robust standard errors clustered at 
community level are reported in parentheses. Wild-cluster bootstrap-t p-values are reported in square brackets. Family-wise p-values are reported in curly 
brackets *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10 %, 5 %, and 1 % levels, respectively.  
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Appendix B 
Figure B.1: Original Study Design  
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Table B.1: Effects of the Original Interventions on Enrollment.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Short-run Long-run
(1) (2)
Subsidy only 0.436*** 0.160*
(0.046) (0.082)
Campaign only 0.161** 0.044
(0.080) (0.066)
Convenience only 0.007 0.195***
(0.066) (0.072)
Campaign & Convenience 0.231 0.182
(0.165) (0.159)
Subsidy & Convenience 0.347*** 0.155**
(0.078) (0.064)
Subsidy & Campaign 0.520*** 0.080
(0.075) (0.094)
Subsidy & Camp & Conven 0.458*** 0.397***
(0.064) (0.083)
R-squared 0.318 0.166
Mean 0.504 0.379
Control group mean 0.272 0.230
Number of observations 4,168 3,415
P-value on test of equality 
Sub + Camp = Sub & Camp 0.477 0.330
Sub + Conv = Sub & Conv 0.323 0.090
Camp + Conv = Camp & Conv 0.756 0.770
Sub + Camp + Conv = Sub & Camp & Conv 0.211 0.991
Enrollment 
Notes: This table presents the effects of original intervention on enrollment in health insurance in 
short and long run. All regressions include a standard set of covariates (individual, household, and 
community) and baseline measure of dependent variable. P-values for the equality of effect 
estimates are also presented. Robust standard errors clustered at the community level are reported 
in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10 %, 5 %, and 1 % levels, 
respectively. 
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Table B.2: Effects on Enrollment with Restricted Sample. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Short-run Long-run
(1) (4)
Panel A
Any Subsidy 0.424*** 0.135*
(0.044) (0.074)
R-squared 0.399 0.228
Panel B
Partial subsidy (positive price) 0.405*** 0.095
(0.047) (0.067)
Full subsidy (free) 0.514*** 0.317***
(0.090) (0.105)
R-squared 0.401 0.238
Panel C
1/3 subsidy 0.387*** 0.137*
(0.084) (0.080)
2/3 subsidy 0.419*** 0.063
(0.062) (0.067)
Full subsidy (free) 0.514*** 0.316***
(0.090) (0.105)
R-squared 0.401 0.239
Mean 0.405 0.290
Control group mean 0.272 0.230
Number of observations 1,614 1,304
Enrollment 
Notes: This table corresponds to Table 2, but the sample is restricted to subsidy only and 
control groups. All regressions include a standard set of covariates (individual, household, 
and community) and baseline measure of dependent variable. Robust standard errors 
clustered at community level are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical 
significance at 10 %, 5 %, and 1 % levels, respectively. 
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Table B.3: Effects on Health Care Utilization with Restricted Sample (Short Run). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Visited health 
facility in last 
four weeks
Visited health 
facility in last 
six months
# of visits in last 
four weekss
Visited Facility 
for malaria 
treatment in the 
last four weeks
Made an out-of-
pocket for health 
service in the last 
six months
Standardized 
treatment effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A
Any subsidy -0.011 -0.009 -0.007 0.011 -0.018 -0.003
(0.010) (0.020) (0.024) (0.008) (0.016) (0.009)
R-squared 0.121 0.137 0.142 0.113 0.139 0.086
Panel B
Partial subsidy -0.012 -0.005 -0.004 0.014 -0.011 0.001
(0.012) (0.021) (0.028) (0.010) (0.017) (0.011)
Full subsidy -0.001 -0.028 -0.025 -0.010 -0.049* -0.020
(0.020) (0.044) (0.019) (0.013) (0.025) (0.013)
R-squared 0.121 0.137 0.143 0.114 0.141 0.086
Panel C
1/3 subsidy -0.019 -0.014 -0.027 0.016 -0.021 -0.002
(0.020) (0.023) (0.038) (0.012) (0.016) (0.013)
2/3 subsidy -0.006 0.001 0.014 0.013 -0.003 0.003
(0.015) (0.030) (0.032) (0.011) (0.024) (0.013)
Full subsidy -0.001 -0.028 -0.025 -0.010 -0.049* -0.020
(0.019) (0.044) (0.018) (0.013) (0.025) (0.013)
R-squared 0.121 0.138 0.144 0.114 0.141 0.086
Control group mean 0.038 0.101 0.033 0.018 0.046 -0.011
Number of observations 1,200 1,566 1,196 1,263 1,622 6,191
Short run
Notes: This table corresponds to Table 5, but the sample is restricted to subsidy only and control groups. All regressions include a standard 
set of covariates (individual, household, and community) and baseline measure of dependent variable. Robust standard errors clustered at 
community level are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10 %, 5 %, and 1 % levels, respectively. 
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Table B.4: Effects on Health Care Utilization with Restricted Sample (Long Run). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Visited health 
facility in last 
four weeks
Visited health 
facility in last 
six months
# of visits in last 
four weeks
Visited Facility 
for malaria 
treatment in the 
last four weeks
Made an out-of-
pocket for health 
service in the last 
six months
Standardized 
treatment effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A
Any subsidy 0.041*** 0.096*** 0.031** 0.028* 0.003 0.039***
(0.013) (0.026) (0.012) (0.014) (0.006) (0.010)
R-squared 0.109 0.121 0.106 0.104 0.090 0.092
Panel B
Partial subsidy 0.045*** 0.086*** 0.033** 0.030** 0.005 0.041***
(0.013) (0.020) (0.012) (0.014) (0.007) (0.010)
Full subsidy 0.020 0.146** 0.024 0.020 -0.006 0.029
(0.018) (0.060) (0.020) (0.019) (0.009) (0.019)
R-squared 0.110 0.123 0.106 0.104 0.091 0.092
Panel C
1/3 subsidy 0.012 0.071*** 0.012 0.013 -0.001 0.025**
(0.010) (0.025) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.007)
2/3 subsidy 0.070*** 0.097*** 0.048** 0.043* 0.009 0.053***
(0.018) (0.032) (0.019) (0.021) (0.009) (0.017)
Full subsidy 0.020 0.146** 0.024 0.020 -0.006 0.030
(0.019) (0.060) (0.020) (0.020) (0.009) (0.019)
R-squared 0.117 0.123 0.110 0.107 0.091 0.094
Control group mean 0.014 0.044 0.011 0.009 0.012 -0.021
Number of observations 1,236 1,546 1,238 1,236 1,546 6,180
Long run
Notes: This table corresponds to Table 6, but the sample is restricted to subsidy only and control groups. All regressions include a standard 
set of covariates (individual, household, and community) and baseline measure of dependent variable. Robust standard errors clustered at 
community level are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10 %, 5 %, and 1 % levels, respectively. 
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Table B.5: Effects on Health Status with Restricted Sample (Short Run). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Healthy or very 
healthy
# Days ill last 
four weeks
Could not 
perform normal 
daily activities 
due to illness 
last four weeks
# days could not 
perform normal 
daily activities 
due to illness in 
the last four 
weeks
Standardized 
treatment effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A
Any subsidy 0.148*** -0.421** -0.025 -0.315 -0.037**
(0.043) (0.185) (0.017) (0.447) (0.017)
R-squared 0.346 0.139 0.136 0.141 0.107
Panel B
Partial subsidy (positive price) 0.152*** -0.445** -0.021 -0.203 -0.033*
(0.044) (0.196) (0.019) (0.497) (0.018)
Full subsidy (free) 0.130* -0.308 -0.041 -0.854 -0.058**
(0.076) (0.283) (0.038) (0.619) (0.027)
R-squared 0.346 0.139 0.136 0.142 0.107
Panel C
1/3 subsidy 0.157*** -0.740** -0.044 -0.916 -0.061**
(0.047) (0.300) (0.031) (0.728) (0.027)
2/3 subsidy 0.147** -0.225 -0.005 0.343 -0.011
(0.061) (0.250) (0.021) (0.517) (0.021)
Full subsidy (free) 0.130 -0.298 -0.040 -0.836 -0.057**
(0.077) (0.287) (0.038) (0.617) (0.027)
R-squared 0.346 0.141 0.137 0.145 0.109
Control group mean 0.818 0.616 0.082 1.376 0.011
Number of observations 478 1,597 1,603 1,549 5,081
Short run
Notes: This table corresponds to Table 7, but the sample is restricted to subsidy only and control groups. All regressions include a standard set of 
covariates (individual, household, and community) and baseline measure of dependent variable. Robust standard errors clustered at community 
level are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10 %, 5 %, and 1 % levels, respectively. 
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Table B.6: Effects on Health Status with Restricted Sample (Long Run). 
 
 
 
 
Healthy or very 
healthy
# Days ill last 
four weeks
Could not 
perform normal 
daily activities 
due to illness 
last four weeks
# days could not 
perform normal 
daily activities 
due to illness in 
the last four 
weeks
Standardized 
treatment effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A
Any subsidy -0.128** 0.249** 0.042*** 0.243** 0.050***
(0.047) (0.097) (0.013) (0.090) (0.014)
R-squared 0.416 0.095 0.132 0.094 0.083
Panel B
Partial subsidy -0.133** 0.296*** 0.045*** 0.268** 0.055***
(0.058) (0.095) (0.013) (0.097) (0.014)
Full subsidy -0.111 0.019 0.027* 0.122 0.026
(0.126) (0.157) (0.013) (0.097) (0.020)
R-squared 0.416 0.096 0.133 0.095 0.084
Panel C
1/3 subsidy -0.115** 0.287** 0.027*** 0.253** 0.045***
(0.051) (0.107) (0.010) (0.109) (0.014)
2/3 subsidy -0.149 0.303** 0.059*** 0.279** 0.063***
(0.088) (0.128) (0.018) (0.123) (0.019)
Full subsidy -0.110 0.019 0.027* 0.123 0.026
(0.127) (0.157) (0.013) (0.098) (0.020)
R-squared 0.416 0.096 0.135 0.095 0.084
Control group mean 0.792 0.355 0.012 0.083 -0.019
Number of observations 416 1,531 1,530 1,475 4,814
Long run
Notes: This table corresponds to Table 8, but the sample is restricted to subsidy only and control groups. All regressions include a standard set of 
covariates (individual, household, and community) and baseline measure of dependent variable. Robust standard errors clustered at community 
level are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10 %, 5 %, and 1 % levels, respectively. 
